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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce the family of
Anonymized Local Privacy mechanisms. These mechanisms have
an output space of multiple values (e.g.,“Yes”, “No”, or “⊥” (not
participating)) and leverage the law of large numbers to generate
linear noise in the number of data owners to protect privacy both
before and after aggregation yet preserve accuracy.
We describe the suitability in a distributed on-demand network
and evaluate over a real dataset as we scale the population.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal mobile information is being continuously collected
and analyzed with minimal regard to privacy. As we transition
from small mobile personal devices to large-scale sensor
collecting self-driving vehicles the needs of privacy increase.
Differential privacy has emerged as the gold standard for
privacy protection. Differential privacy essentially states that
whether or not a single data owner decides to participate
in data collection, the final aggregate information will be
perturbed only by a negligible amount. That is, the aggregate
information released gives no hints to the adversary about a
particular data owner. However, differential private techniques
do not add noise linear in the number of data owners to
protect. Techniques, such as the Laplace mechanism, add noise
calibrated to the sensitivity of the query output, rather than
linear in the number of data owners to protect, in order to
preserve accuracy [7].
We introduce the family of Anonymized Local Privacy
mechanisms and present constructions with better accuracy
than randomized response.
Randomized response has been shown to be optimal in
the local privacy setting [4]. However, in order to preserve
accuracy with the randomized response mechanism, privacy
must be sacrificed as the data owners must respond truthfully
too frequently. For example, a data owner should respond
truthfully more than 80% of the time to have decent accuracy
which greatly minimizes any privacy gains [15], [14]. The
reason is due to the high variance from the coin tosses [20]. As
more aggressive sampling is performed, the variance quickly
increases making it difficult to perform accurate estimation of
the underlying distribution.
As a result of the accuracy problem, there have been various
privacy-preserving systems which focus on the heavy-hitters
only [9], [2]. These techniques ensure privacy only for large
populations and can only detect or estimate the most frequently
occurring distributions, rather than smaller or less frequently
occurring populations.
Our contribution is the ability to maintain strong privacy
while maintaining the fidelity of the data. The output space of
Anonymized Local Privacy mechanisms is three values “Yes”,
“No”, or “⊥” (not participating) as opposed to solely two
values “Yes” or “No” . Three output values allows for robust
estimation, as we show in Section §??.
We evaluate the accuracy of our privacy-preserving ap-
proach utilizing a vehicular crowdsourcing scenario compris-
ing of approximately 50,000 records. In this dataset, each ve-
hicle reports its location utilizing the California Transportation
Dataset from magnetic pavement sensors (see Section §??).
II. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy [5], [7], [6], [8] has been proposed as a
mechanism to privately share data such that anything that can
be learned if a particular data owner is included in the database
can also be learned if the particular data owner is not included
in the database. To achieve this privacy guarantee, differential
privacy mandates that only a sublinear number of queries have
access to the database and that noise proportional to the global
sensitivity of the counting query is added (independent of the
number of data owners).
Distributional privacy [1] is a privacy mechanism which
says that the released aggregate information only reveals the
underlying ground truth distribution and nothing else. This
protects individual data owners and is strictly stronger than
differential privacy. However, it is computationally inefficient
though can work over a large class of queries known as
Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension.
Zero-knowledge privacy [12] is a cryptographically influ-
enced privacy definition that is strictly stronger than differ-
ential privacy. Crowd-blending privacy [11] is weaker than
differential privacy; however, with a pre-sampling step, sat-
isfies both differential privacy and zero-knowledge privacy.
However, these mechanisms do not add noise linear in the
number of data owners and rely on aggressive sampling, which
negatively impact the accuracy estimations.
The randomized response based mechanisms [22], [10],
[13], [21] satisfies the differential privacy mechanism as
well as stronger mechanisms such as zero-knowledge privacy.
However, the accuracy of the randomized response mechanism
quickly degrades unless the coin toss values are configured to
large values (e.g., greater than 80%).
III. PRELIMINARIES
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy has become the gold
standard privacy mechanism which ensures that the output of
2a sanitization mechanism does not violate the privacy of any
individual inputs.
Definition 1 ([5], [7]). (ε-Differential Privacy). A privacy
mechanism San() provides ε-differential privacy if, for all
datasets D1 and D2 differing on at most one record (i.e., the
Hamming distance H() is H(D1,D2)≤ 1), and for all outputs
O⊆ Range(San()):
sup
D1,D2
Pr[San(D1) ∈ O]
Pr[San(D2) ∈ O]
≤ exp(ε) (1)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechanism San
produces a given output is almost independent of the presence
or absence of any individual record in the dataset. The closer
the distributions are (i.e., smaller ε), the stronger the privacy
guarantees become and vice versa.
Private Write. More generally, we assume some class of
private information storage [19] mechanisms are utilized by
the data owner to cryptographically protect their writes to
cloud services.
IV. ANONYMIZED LOCAL PRIVACY
First, we define the structure of an anonymized local private
mechanism. We then illustrate various mechanisms that satisfy
Anonymized Local Privacy. Finally, we provide the mecha-
nism for preserving accuracy in the Anonymized Local Privacy
model.
A. Structure
An anonymized local privacy mechanism answers “Yes”,
“No”, or ⊥ (not participating). For our purposes, we use the
notation of the Yes population as the ground truth and the
remaining data owners are the No population. Each popu-
lation should blend with each other such that the aggregate
information that is released is unable to be used to increase
the confidence or inference of an adversary that is trying to
determine the value of a specific data owner.
Data owners are aggressively sampled (e.g., 5%). To over-
come the estimation error due to the large variance, the
estimation of the noisy “Yes” counts and sampled counts are
combined to offset each other and effectively cancel the noise,
allowing for the aggressive sampling.
B. Sampling
Sampling whereby a centralized aggregator randomly dis-
cards responses has been previously formulated as a mech-
anism to amplify privacy [3], [18], [16], [17], [11]. The
intuition is that when sampling approximates the original ag-
gregate information, an attacker is unable to distinguish when
sampling is performed and which data owners are sampled.
These privacy mechanisms range from sampling without a
sanitization mechanism, sampling to amplify a differentially
private mechanism, sampling that tolerates a bias, and even
sampling a weaker privacy notion such as k-anonymity to
amplify the privacy guarantees.
However, sampling alone has several issues. First, data
owners that answer “Yes” do not have the protection of
strong plausible deniability as they never respond “No” or are
“forced“ to respond “Yes” (e.g., via coin tosses). Data owners
that answer “No” do not provide privacy protection as they
never answer “Yes”. Second, as we increase the sampling rate
the variance will increase rapidly, thus weakening accuracy.
Finally, the privacy strength of the population does not increase
as the population increases. The Yes population is fixed (e.g.,
those at a particular location) and we can only increase the No
population. The No population should also contribute noise by
answering “Yes” in order to strengthen privacy.
C. Sampling and Noise
We could leverage the No population by use the same
sampling rate though for the No population have a portion
respond “Yes”. To perform the final estimation we simply
subtract the estimated added noise.
Sampling and Noise Response. Each data owner privatizes
their actual value Value by performing the following Bernoulli
trial. Let pis be either the sampling probability for the Yes
population as pisYes or for the No population as pisNo .
Privatized Value =
{
⊥ with probability 1−pis
Value with probability pis
(2)
That is, a percentage of the Yes population responds “Yes”
and a percentage of the No population responds “Yes” (pro-
viding noise). However, the Yes data owners do not answer
“No” and also do not have plausible deniability (that is being
forced via coin toss to respond “Yes”).
D. Sampling and Plausible Deniability
We would like to have a percentage of each population
respond opposite of their actual value, provide plausible deni-
ability, and have outputs from the space of “Yes”, “No”, and
⊥ (not participating) in order for the data owners to blend
with each other.
To achieve plausible deniability via coin tosses we have
a small percentage of the “Yes” population be “forced” to
respond “Yes”. The other output values follow from the
sampling and noise scenario.
Privatized Value =


⊥ with probability 1−pisYes
1 with probability
pisYes × (pi1+(1−pi1)×pi2)
0 otherwise
(3)
Privatized Value =


⊥ with probability 1−pisNo
1 with probability
pisNo × ((1−pi1)×pi2)
0 otherwise
(4)
A benefit of plausible deniability is that the estimation
of the population will provides privacy protection via noise.
3However, it is difficult to estimate the underlying ground truth
due to the added noise. We desire better calibration over the
privacy mechanism.
E. Mechanism
The optimal mechanism for anonymized local privacy
should have the following characteristics. The output space
should be three values of “Yes”, “No”, and ⊥. A fraction of
each of the Yes and No population should be included. Each
population should have some notion of plausible deniability.
The total number of data owners DO can be computed by
summing the total number of “Yes”, “No”, and ⊥ responses.
It should be noted that if the data owners would not write ⊥
it would be difficult to estimate and calculate the underlying
Yes count.
Definition 2. (Minimal Variance Parameters) We model the
sum of independent Bernoulli trials that are not identically
distributed, as the poisson binomial distribution (we combine
“No” and ⊥ into the same output space for modeling pur-
poses). Let Yes′ represent those that respond “Yes”, regardless
if they are from the Yes or No population.
The success probabilities are due to the contributions from
the Yes and No populations. We then sum and search for the
minimum variance.
Utility is maximized when:
min(Var(P(“Yes”|Yes))+Var(P(“Yes”|No))) (5)
There are a couple observations. The first is that uniform
sampling across both populations (Yes and No) limits the
ability to achieve optimal variance. As we increase the No
population by increasing the queries and the number of data
owners that participate, the variance will correspondingly in-
crease. For example, 10% sampling will incur a large variance
for a population of one million data owners. To address this,
the sampling parameters should be separately tuned for each
population. We desire a small amount of data owners to be
sampled from the Yes population to protect privacy and an even
smaller amount from the No population (as this population will
be large and only a small amount is required for linear noise).
The other observation is that for the plausible deniability,
by fixing the probabilities the same across the Yes and No
population also restricts the variance that can be achieved.
Thus, the optimal anonymized local privacy mechanism is
one that tunes both populations.
Mechanism. Let pis be either the sampling probability for the
Yes population as pisYes or for the No population as pisNo . Let
pip be either the plausible deniability parameter for the Yes
population as pi1 or the No population pi2 respectively. The
mechanism that we use which satisfies Anonymized Local
Privacy is as follows:
Privatized Value =


⊥ with probability
1− (pisYes1 +pisYes2 )
1 with probability pisYes1
×pi1
1 with probability pisYes2
×pi2
0 with probability
pisYes1
× (1−pi1)+
pisYes2
× (1−pi2)
(6)
Privatized Value =


⊥ with probability 1−pisNo
1 with probability
pisNo ×pi3
0 otherwise
(7)
It should be noted that pisYes1
×pi1 are the percentage of data
owners that answer truthfully “Yes” and pisYes2
× pi2 are the
percentage of data owners that are “forced” to respond “Yes”
providing the plausible deniability. Each case has its own coin
toss parameters in order to be able to fine tune the variance and
reduce the estimation error as opposed to the prior examples
where the variance cascades across terms adding error.
V. ACCURACY
Let DO be the total number of data owners. Let YES and
NO be the population count of those that truthfully respond
“Yes” and “No” respectively such that Y ES+NO = DO.
Lemma 1. (Yes Estimate From Aggregated Count)
Expected value of “Yes” responses is:
E[“Yes”] = piYes1×pi1×YES+
piYes2 ×pi2×YES+
piNo×pi3× (DO−YES)
(10)
Solving for YES results in:
YES =
E[“Yes”]− (piNo×pi3×DO)
(piYes1 ×pi1)+ (piYes2×pi2)− (piNo×pi3)
(11)
The estimator ˆYESYes accounting for the standard deviation
σ(“Yes”) is:
ˆYESYes =
E[“Yes”]±σ(“Yes”)− (piNo×pi3×DO)
(piYes1 ×pi1)+ (piYes2×pi2)− (piNo×pi3)
(12)
Lemma 2. Standard Deviation of the Aggregated “Yes” Count
The standard deviation σ(“Yes”) is:
Var(“Yes”) = ((piYes1 ×pi1+piYes2×pi2)×
(1− (piYes1×pi1+piYes2×pi2))×
YES)+
(piNo×pi3×
(1− (piNo×pi3))×
NO)
(13)
4σ(“Yes”) =
√
Var(“Yes”) (14)
Lemma 3. (Yes Estimate From Aggregated “No” Count)
Expected value of “Yes” responses is:
E[“Yes”] = piYes1 × (1−pi1)×YES+
piYes2 × (1−pi2)×YES+
piNo× (1−pi3)× (DO−YES)
(15)
Solving for Y ES results in:
YES =
E[“Yes”]− (piNo× (1−pi3)×DO)
(piYes1 × (1−pi1))+ (piYes2× (1−pi2))− (piNo× (1−pi3))
(16)
The estimator ˆYESNo accounting for the standard deviation
σ(“No”) is:
ˆYESNo =
E[“Yes”]±σ(“Yes”)− (piNo× (1−pi3)×DO)
(piYes1 × (1−pi1))+ (piYes2× (1−pi2))− (piNo× (1−pi3))
(17)
Lemma 4. Standard Deviation of the Aggregated “No” Count
The standard deviation σ(“No”) is:
Var(“Yes”) = ((piYes1 × (1−pi1)+piYes2× (1−pi2))×
(1− (piYes1× (1−pi1)+piYes2× (1−pi2)))×
YES)+
(piNo× (1−pi3)×
(1− (piNo× (1−pi3)))×
NO)
(18)
σ(“No”) =
√
Var(“No”) (19)
Lemma 5. (Yes Estimate From Sampled Population)
Expected value of ⊥ (not participating) responses is:
E[⊥] = (1− (piYes1 +piYes2))×YES+
(1−piNo)× (DO−YES)
(20)
Solving for Y ES results in:
YES =
E[⊥]− ((1−piNo)×DO)
(1− (piYes1 +piYes2))− (1−piNo)
(21)
The estimator ˆYES⊥ accounting for the standard deviation
σ(⊥) is:
ˆYES⊥ =
E[⊥]±σ(⊥)− ((1−piNo)×DO)
(1− (piYes1 +piYes2))− (1−piNo)
(22)
Lemma 6. Standard Deviation of the Sampled Population
The standard deviation σ(⊥) is:
Var(⊥) = ((1− (piYes1 +piYes2))×
(piYes1 +piYes2)×
YES)+
((1−piNo)×
piNo×
NO)
(23)
σ(⊥) =
√
Var(⊥) (24)
Lemma 7. Solving for Y ES
There are two approaches we can take. We can either use
the “Yes” estimators to estimate the underlying population as
described earlier. Or we can treat the equations as a system
of linear equations.
The observation is that setting pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1 results in
the standard deviation being equal for σ(“Yes”), σ(“No”),
and σ(⊥). This has the effect of resulting in no “No”
responses and the two equations are thus dependant.
We have the following system of linear equations of two
unknown variables YES and σ as follows:
E[“Yes”]±σ = Observed(“Yes”) (25)
E[⊥]±σ = Observed(⊥) (26)
E[“Yes”]±σ +E[⊥]±σ = DO (27)
We then solve for YES and σ for each combination of
varying ± signs using a solver. We eliminate the solutions
which assign Y ES a negative value.
It would be nice if we could cancel out the error. It would
also be nice if the system of linear equations above would
have exactly one solution. However, it’s not clear that we can
immediately guarantee this.
VI. FIRST ATTEMPT CANCELLING THE NOISE
As we control the randomization, can we construct a mech-
anism whereby the error introduced by the NO population
cancels out? Performing uniform sampling across both Y ES
and NO populations allows us to cancel the population error
though we are not able to precisely estimate the YES popula-
tion as it also cancels out the Y ES terms.
One observation is that the error terms potentially could
cancel out if the signs were flipped. Thus, we construct our
mechanism as follows. Each data owner responds twice for
the same query, though slightly flips a single term to allow
for the error cancelation.
YESA Privatized Value=


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥1 with probability piY
⊥2 with probability 1−pi⊥1−piY
(28)
5NOA Privatized Value=


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥1 with probability pi⊥N
⊥2 with probability 1−pi⊥1−pi⊥N
(29)
YESB Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1−piY
⊥2 with probability piY
⊥2 with probability 1−pi⊥1
(30)
NOB Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1−pi⊥N
⊥2 with probability pi⊥N
⊥2 with probability 1−pi⊥1
(31)
The expected values are as follows:
E[⊥1A ] = (pi⊥1 +piY )×YES+(pi⊥1 +piN)×NO
= pi⊥1×YES+piY ×YES+pi⊥1×NO+piN ×NO
= pi⊥1×TOTAL+piY ×YESA +piN ×NO
= pi⊥1×TOTAL+piY ×YESA +piN ×TOTAL−piN ×YES
(32)
E[⊥1B ] = (pi⊥1−piY )×YES+(pi⊥1−piN)×NO
= pi⊥1×YES−piY ×YES+pi⊥1×NO−piN ×NO
= pi⊥1×TOTAL−piY ×YES−piN ×NO
= pi⊥1×TOTAL−piY ×YES− (piN ×TOTAL−piN ×YES)
= pi⊥1×TOTAL−piY ×YES−piN ×TOTAL+piN ×YES
(33)
E[⊥2A ] = (1−pi⊥2−pi⊥Y )×YES+(1−pi⊥2−piN)×NO
= (1−pi⊥2)×TOTAL−piY ×YES−piN ×NO
= (1−pi⊥2)×TOTAL−piY ×YES− (piN ×TOTAL−piN ×YES)
= (1−pi⊥2)×TOTAL−piY ×YES−piN ×TOTAL+piN ×YES
(34)
E[⊥2B ] = (1−pi⊥2)×YES+⊥Y ×YES+
(1−pi⊥2)×NO+⊥N ×NO
= (1−pi⊥2)×TOTAL+piY ×YES+piN ×NO
= (1−pi⊥2)×TOTAL+piY ×YES+
piN ×TOTAL−piN ×YES
(35)
We should now be able to subtract either pairs of ex-
pected values and solve for YES. Either E[⊥1A]−E[⊥1B ] or
E[⊥2A ]−E[⊥2B]. However, the variance of the total population
multiplied by the piN contributes error as the NO population
grows.
One option is to simply create a third output where the
value piN × TOTAL. We then can eliminate this value from
both systems of equations and solve for Y ES.
VII. CANCELLING THE NOISE
The observation is that we are shifting fractions of the
population across two outputs. By expanding to three outputs
we can shift the population to isolate the YES population for
estimation. We shift the Y ES and NO population to the third
output space to blend these crowds.
YESA Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥1 with probability piY
⊥2 with probability pi⊥2
⊥3 with probability pi⊥3
(36)
NOA Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥2 with probability pi⊥N
⊥2 with probability pi⊥2
⊥3 with probability pi⊥3
(37)
YESB Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥2 with probability pi⊥2
⊥3 with probability pi⊥Y
⊥3 with probability pi⊥3
(38)
NOB Privatized Value =


⊥1 with probability pi⊥1
⊥2 with probability pi⊥N
⊥3 with probability pi⊥N
⊥3 with probability pi⊥3
(39)
The expected values are as follows:
E[⊥1A ] = pi⊥1 ×YES+piY ×YES+pi⊥1×NO
= pi⊥1 ×TOTAL+piY ×YES
(40)
E[⊥2A ] = pi⊥2 ×YES+(pi⊥1 +piN)×NO
= pi⊥2 ×YES+pi⊥1×NO+piN ×NO
= pi⊥2 ×TOTAL+piN ×NO
(41)
E[⊥3A] = pi⊥3×YES+pi⊥3×NO
= pi⊥3×TOTAL
(42)
E[⊥1B] = pi⊥1×YES+pi⊥1×NO
= pi⊥1×TOTAL
(43)
E[⊥2B] = pi⊥2×YES+pi⊥2×NO
= pi⊥2×TOTAL
(44)
E[⊥3A ] = (pi⊥3 +pi⊥Y )×YES+(pi⊥3 +pi⊥N )×NO
= pi⊥3×TOTAL+pi⊥Y ×YES+pi⊥N ×NO
(45)
We should now be able to subtract the pairs of expected
values, scale the NO population, eliminate the error due to the
population variance, and solve for YES. by E[⊥1A ]−E[⊥1B].
The estimation error is now only due to estimating the
sampled Y ES population, so need to choose accordingly when
YES is known to be small.
6A. Privacy Algebra
To simplify reasoning regarding “shifting” the populations
to protect privacy and cancel the noise due to the population
variance, we introduce privacy algebra notation to simplify our
expressions.
Let TOTAL = YES+NO
Let TOTALn = pi⊥n ×TOTAL
Let YESY = piY ×YES
Let YES f = pi f ×piN ×YES
Let NO f = piN ×NO
Let NON = pi f ×piN ×NO
(46)
B. Plausible Deniability
While we are able to cancel the noise and estimate the
Y ES population, there is no plausible deniability as the YES
population is exposed. We achieve this by utilizing an output
space of three with three separate answers.
E[⊥1A ] = TOTAL1+YESY +NON (47)
E[⊥2A ] = TOTAL2 (48)
E[⊥3A ] = TOTAL3 (49)
E[⊥1B ] = TOTAL1+YESY −YES f1−YES f2+
NON −NO f1−NO f2
(50)
E[⊥2B ] = TOTAL2+YES f1 +NO f1 (51)
E[⊥3B ] = TOTAL3+YES f2 +NO f2 (52)
E[⊥1C ] = TOTAL1+YESY −YES f1−YES f2+
NON −NO f1−NO f2
(53)
E[⊥2C ] = TOTAL2+YES f1 +NO f1 +NO f21 (54)
E[⊥3C ] = TOTAL3+YES f2 +NO f2−NO f21 (55)
Working backwards we can start with solving for NO f21
to
eventually solve for YES.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrate that we can add noise linear
in the number of data owners to protect while preserving
privacy. We introduce the family of Anonymized Local Privacy
mechanisms.
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